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Introduction 
Although genetic engineering is a prom1Smg 
tool for crop varietal development, genetically 
modified foods continue to be controversial. 
Many groups that oppose these new goods are 
supporting a public policy of mandatory 
labelling for GM content. Debate, however, con-
tirmes over whether the USA should impose a 
mandatory labelling policy for genetically modi-
fied (GM) foods. Groups that favour a manda-
tory labelling policy for GM foods include 
Greenpeace International (1997) Friends of the 
Earth (2001), and the Consumers Union 
(Consumer Reports, 1999). Groups opposing 
mandatory GM labels include the Council for 
Biotechnology Information (2001) and the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (2001). 
This contentious issue has engaged debate from 
all sides of the spectrum, yet only modest eco-
nomic research has examined the merits and 
pitfalls of a new regulation that requires manda-
tory labelling for GM foods in the USA. 
This chapter examines the potential wel-
fare effects of imposing a mandatory GM-
labelling policy in the USA. We first discuss 
when a mandatory labelling policy is likely to 
benefit consumers. We then describe an 
experimental auction designed to provide data 
that are needed to test whether consumers 
will benefit from a mandatory GM-labelling 
policy. For a sample of adult consumers living 
in two major Midwestern cities, our results do 
not contradict the hypothesis that consumers 
interpret voluntary and mandatory market sig-
nals identically. These findings suggest that it 
would be more e fficient or welfare improving 
for the USA to continue its voluntary labelling 
policy and resist calls for new regulations that 
mandate labelling of GM foods. 
1 The authors gratefu lly acknowledge assistance from Daniel Monchuk and Terrance Hurley in conducting 
the auctions and assistance from Monsanto in providing some of the products used in the experiment. 
Authors received helpful comments on the chapter from participants at the ICABR Conference, Ravello, 
Italy, July 2002. This work was supported through a grant from the US Department of Agriculture 
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, under Agreement 00-52100-961 7 and 
from the US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, under Agreement 43-JAEL-8-
80125, and by the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station. Views presented in this 
chapter are the authors and do not represent those of ERS or USDA. 
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Background on Labels 
Caswell (1998, 2000) emphasizes that the 
list of potential GM labelling policies is large, 
and includes mandatory labelling of GM foods 
voluntary labelling of GM foods and bans on 
all labelling. An informed decision about 
labelling policies for GM foods should only be 
made after a careful benefit-cost analysis. 
Caswell points out that a voluntary labelling 
programme is likely to be a better policy 
option for a country that has only a small 
segment of the population that is concerned 
about GM foods, but a mandatory labelling 
system is likely to be the best policy option in 
countries where a large share of the popula-
tion wants to know if their food is GM. A 
model by Kirchhoff and Zago (2001) reached 
a similar conclusion - voluntary GM-labelling 
policies may be better for a country that has 
more consumers who are concerned with 
cost savings, while mandatory GM-labelling 
policies may be better for more GM-averse 
consumers. 
The USA does not require mandatory 
labelling for most GM foods. In January 
2001, the FDA issued a 'Guidance for 
Industry' statement for labelling GM products, 
which stated that the only GM foods that need 
to be labelled are ones that have different 
characteristics from their non-GM versions. 
Labelling is not required for any other GM 
foods, but firms in the USA do have the 
option of voluntarily indicating whether their 
food is GM. Canada also has a similar volun-
tary labelling policy. 
The European Union (EU) requires that 
all foods have the label 'genetically modified' 
if any ingredient in the food is at least 1 % 
GM. The European Parliament voted for 
stricter regulations in early 2001. 2 The new 
regulations call for stricter labelling and mon-
itoring of GM products and allow for the 
tracing of GM products through the food 
chain (CNN, 2001). The EU standards are 
the minimum standards that member coun-
tries must adhere to, although countries can 
have stricter standards. Several other coun-
tries around the world have mandatory 
labelling policies for GM foods, including 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand. For a 
detailed review of labelling policies, see 
Rousu and Huffman (2001) or Phillips and 
McNeil! (2000). 
Some groups think that mandating GM 
labels would improve a society's welfare. 
Many environmental and consumer advo-
cacy groups call for mandatory labelling of 
GM foods, which they believe benefits 
consumers (Greenpeace International, 
1997; Friends of the Earth, 2001; 
Consumer Reports, 1999). Greenpeace 
and Friends of the Earth both advocate 
labels on GM foods to give consumers the 
opportunity to choose whether to con-
sume GM foods. Other benefits of labelling 
are that labels make it easier to find infor-
mation on food products, can increase 
consumer information and can improve 
product design. 
Relatively few estimates of the costs of 
GM food labelling exist. The 
accounting/consulting firm KPMG was 
commissioned for a study in Australia and 
f:'iew Zealand to examine the costs of comply-
ing with new labelling laws. They estimated 
that the costs of the labelling laws could 
mean an increase in consumer prices from 
0.5 to 15%, and that firms could also receive 
lower profits (Phillips and Foster, 2000). Even 
though they commissioned the study, the 
Australia New Zealand Food Authority (2001) 
disregarded KPMG's study, citing two flaws. 
Whether this council had legitimate problems 
with the study or were responding to political 
pressure, we do not know. Smyth and 
Phillips (2002) estimated that a voluntary 
identity-preserved production and marketing 
system in Canada cost from 13 to 15% 
during 1995-1996. In a related study, 
Wilson and Dahl (2002) estimate that identity 
preservation costs would be $3.50 per bushel 
for GM wheat, assuming a 1 % tolerance 
level. The Philippine Chamber of Food 
Manufacturers warned that mandatory GM 
food labels would increase production costs 
2 New regulations passed in 2002 will move this threshold down to 0.5% before the product must be 
labelled as GM. 
by 15%, and that the increased costs would 
be passed on to consumers (AgBiotech 
Reporter, 2001). One issue seems apparent: 
implementing a labelling policy for GM foods 
is costly, even if the exact magnitude of the 
costs is unknown. 
When Would Consumers Benefit from a 
Mandatory Labelling Policy? 
With asymmetric information between food 
suppliers and consumers, consumers regu-
larly must read signals about product quality. 
For brand-name products, consumer pur-
chases are higher for some brands than oth-
ers, and consumers are frequently willing to 
try a product based on external signals about 
the product (e.g. packaging, labelling, adver-
tisements, etc.). The question we examine is 
how would mandatory labelling of GM foods 
help consumers in purchasing food 
products?3 
The key benefit that a mandatory labelling 
policy could have is if it were to help con-
sumers distinguish genetically modified from 
non-genetically modified food products. This 
is why many groups call for mandatory 
labelling of GM foods (e.g. see Greenpeace 
International, 1997). But without mandatory 
labelling there are still both GM and non-GM 
food products sold - so an ideal test of 
whether consumer welfare would improve 
from a mandatory labelling policy is to test if a 
market that has mandatory GM labelling 
makes it easier for consumers to distinguish 
GM food products from non-GM food prod-
ucts (relative to voluntary GM labelling). The 
next section outlines how we test this using 
experimental auctions. 
Experimental Design 
We designed two experimental auction mar-
kets, one emulating a market that has manda-
tory labelling in place and another which 
emulates a market that has voluntary labelling 
in place. We then test for similarity of con-
sumer bids for three different food products -
vegetable oil, tortilla chips and Russet potatoes. 
Experimental units are randomly assigned 
labelling treatments. Some consumers bid on 
foods with positive GM labels - the labels that 
would arise in a mandatory labelling regime; 
others bid on food with negative GM labels -
the labels that would arise in a voluntary 
labelling regime. 4 If bidding behaviour for GM 
and GM-free food differs across the two mar-
kets, this would indicate that the mandatory 
market presents different signals than a volun-
tary market. If bidding behaviour does not dif-
fer, then we would find no evidence that a 
mandatory labelling policy assists consumers in 
accomplishing their main objective - informing 
consumers. However, finding a change in bid-
ding behaviour is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition for a mandatory labelling policy 
to be welfare-improving. 
The experimental design consisted of four 
biotech information labelling treatments with 
each treatment replicated at least four times. 
The treatments were randomly assigned to 
ten experimental units, each consisting of 
13- 16 consumers drawn from the households 
of two major urban areas and who were paid 
to participate. 
We now describe the four elements in our 
GM-labelling experiments - the GM food, the 
auction mechanism, the experimental units 
and the specific steps in the experiment, which 
includes the detailed information on the labels. 
3 In this chapter we present the intuition behind when a mandatory labelling would benefit consumers, 
and that a voluntary labelling policy is more efficient than a mandatory labelling policy if consumers can 
distinguish between GM and non-GM foods identically in either market. A model which derives this for-
mally is presented in our technical counterpart to this chapter (Huffman et al., 2002). 
• These experimental markets were chosen to emulate the mandatory and voluntary GM-labelling regimes 
currently in place throughout the world. Our mandatory regime reflects the labels consumers might find 
in Europe, where foods that are GM must be labelled as such. Our voluntary labelling regime captures the 
labels that consumers might see in the USA, where food manufacturers can label their products as non-
genetically engineered if they choose. We do not examine several other potential but currently non-
implemented labelling policies, including a mandatory labelling policy that requires all non-GM foods to 
be labelled or a policy that requires every food product in a market to be labelled as GM or non-GM. 
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The food products and auction 
mechanism 
Participants in our auction bid on three unre-
lated food items: a 32-ounce bottle of veg-
etable oil,s a 16-ounce bag of tortilla chips 
(made from yellow maize) and a 5-pound bag 
of Russet potatoes. They bid on these items 
using the random nth-price auction. 
We chose the random nth-price auction for 
our GM food experiments because it is 
designed to engage both the on- and off-the-
margin bidders (see Shogren et al., 2001).6 
This is an aid in identifying the whole demand 
curve (rather than a short segment) for a new 
good. The random nth-price works as follows. 
Each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit of 
a good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered 
from highest to lowest. The auction monitor 
then selects a random number - the n in the 
nth-price auction, which is drawn from a uni-
form distribution between 2 and k, and the 
auction monitor sells one unit of the good to 
each of the n - 1 highest bidders at the nth-
price. For instance, if the monitor randomly 
selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each 
purchase one unit of the good priced at the 
fourth highest bid. Ex ante, bidders who have 
low or moderate valuations now have a non-
trivial chance to buy the good because the 
price is determined randomly. This auction 
increases the probability that insincere bidding 
will be costly. 
Auctions were planned and conducted in 
two Midwestern US cities: Des Moines, Iowa, 
and St Paul, Minnesota, in 2001. Consumers 
were contacted through a random digit 
dialling method and were asked if they would 
participate in a group session that related 'to 
how people select food and household prod-
ucts', and they were informed that the session 
would last about 90 minutes. 7 They were also 
told that at the end of the session each partici-
pant would receive $40 in cash for his/her 
time. From the initial sample of usable ran-
domly selected numbers, the percentage of 
people who accepted the offer to participate 
and then showed up at the auction was 
approximately 19%. 
Our total sample size of participants is 
142, and Table 4 .1 summarizes the character-
istics of the auction participants: 60% are 
female, mean age is 51 years and mean 
household income is $51,600. 
Sequence of steps in the experiments 
Rgure 4.1 shows the ten steps in each experi-
mental unit. In Step 1 when participants 
arrived at the experiment, they signed a con-
sent form agreeing to participate in the auc-
tion. After they signed this form, they were 
given $40 for participating and an ID number 
to preserve their anonymity. The treatments 
were randomly assigned to each experimental 
unit, so the observed and unobserved charac-
teristics of observations are uncorrelated with 
the treatments. The participants then read brief 
instructions and filled out a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was purposefully given to con-
sumers before the experiment to elicit demo-
graphic information and to capture consumers' 
prior perception of GM foods before bidding, 
which allowed us to compare their prior beliefs 
to their posterior beliefs after the experiment. 
5 For the oil, soybean oil was used for the mandatory labelling trials, and canola oil was used for the vol-
untary/ labelling trials. The soybean oil was initially used in the April experiments. We then tried to pur-
chase non-GM soybean oil in 32-ounce bottles and were unsuccessful. The bids for the vegetable oil 
follow the same trend as the other products and are discussed in the results section. The other products 
(and packaging) were absolutely identical, except for the presence or absence of genetic modification. 
6 The auction combines elements of two classic demand-revealing mechanisms: the Vickrey (1961 J auc-
tion and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) random pricing mechanism. The key characteristic of the 
random nth price auction is a random but endogenously determined market-clearing price. Randomness 
is used to give all participants a positive probability of being a purchaser of the auctioned good; the 
endogenous price ensures that the market-clearing price is related to the bidders' private values. 
7 We considered the possibility that the demand for GM foods may change over the 8 months between 
auctions, so we replicated two experimental units, using the exact same procedures. We found no evi-
dence that willingness to pay for GM-labelled foods had changed over time. 
Table 4.1. Characteristics of the auction participants. 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Gender 1 if female 0.60 0.49 
Age The participant's age 51.40 18.1 
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.65 0.48 
Education Years of schooling 14.74 2.36 
Household Number of people in participanrs household 2.56 1.49 
Income The household's income level (in thousands) 51.60 33.40 
White 1 if participant is white 0.92 0.27 
Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.02 0.14 
1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.32 
1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.32 0.47 
1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.36 0.48 
1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.18 0.39 
In Step 2, participants were given detailed 
instructions (both oral and written) about how 
the random nth-price auction works, including 
an example written on the blackboard. After 
the participants learned about the auction, a 
short quiz was given to them to ensure that 
everyone understood how the auction 
worked. All experimental instructions are 
available from the authors on request. 
Step 3 was the first practice round of bid-
ding, in which participants bid (in a real auc-
tion) on a brand-name candy bar. The 
participants were all asked to examine the 
product and then to place a bid on the candy 
bar. The bids were collected and the first 
round of practice bidding was over. 
Throughout the auctions, when the partici-
pants were bidding on items in a round, they 
had no indication of what other items they 
may be bidding on in future rounds. 
Step 4 was the second practice round of 
bidding, and in this round the participants 
bid separately on three different items. The 
products were the same brand-name candy 
bar, a deck of playing cards and a box of 
pens. Participants knew that only one of the 
two rounds would be chosen at random to 
be binding, which prevented anyone from 
taking home more than one unit of any 
product. By using only one binding round, 
we avoided problems of demand reduction 
that can occur in multi-unit auctions (List and 
Lucking-Reiley, 2000). The consumers first 
examined the three products and then sub-
mitted their bids. 
After the two practice auction rounds were 
completed, the binding round and the binding 
nth-prices were revealed in Step 5. All bid 
prices were written on the blackboard, and 
the nth-price was circled for each of the three 
products. Participants could see immediately 
what items they won, and the price they 
would pay. The participants were told that the 
exchange of money for goods was in another 
room nearby and would take place after the 
entire experiment was completed. 
In Step 6 , participants received one of two 
potential info-packets that provided non-food 
label information about biotechnology (for a 
detailed look at how information affected the 
demand for foods labelled as GM, see Rousu 
et al., 2002). These info-packets were pro-
duced as follows. We created three informa-
tion sources: (i) the industry perspective - a 
collection of statements and information on 
genetic modification provided by a group of 
leading biotechnology companies, including 
Monsanto and Syngenta; (ii) the environmen-
tal group perspective - a collection of state-
ments and information on genetic modification 
from Greenpeace, a leading environmental 
group; and (iii) the independent third-party 
perspective - a statement on genetic modifica-
tion approved by a third-party group, consist-
ing of a variety of people knowledgeable about 
GM goods, including scientists, professionals, 
religious leaders and academics, who do not 
have a financial stake in GM foods. We limited 
each information source to one full page, 
organized into five categories: general infor-
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Step 1 
Completes consent fonn 
and questionnaire, 
receives $40 and ID 
number 
Step 5 
Binding practice round 
and binding nth-prices 
are revealed 
Step 7 
First round of bidding on 
food products 
Step 9 
Binding food round and 
binding nth-prices are 
revealed 
Fig. 4.1. Steps in the experiment. 
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Step2 
nth-price auction is 
explained 
Step 4 
Auction of a candy bar, 
a deck of cards and a 
box of pens 
Step3 
Candy bar auction 
Step 6 
Both pro- and 
anti-biotechnology 
Both pro- and 
anti-biotechnology and 
third-party infonnation 
Step 8 
Second round of bidding 
on food products 
Step 10 
Post-auction 
questionnaire, winning 
people purchase goods 
mation, scientific impact, human impact, 
financial impact and environmental impact. 
The information sheets are available in Rousu 
et al. (2002) or by request from the authors. 
biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and inde· 
pendently verifiable. B These info-packets were 
then randomized among all ten experimental 
units, with each info-packet going to four 
experimental units. By giving all participants 
both positive and negative information on GM 
foods, and by giving some participants a third· 
These information sources were then ran-
domized to create the two info-packets: (i) both 
pro- and anti-biotechnology and (ii) pro-
8 The order of the positive information and negative information was, also, randomized across consumers. 
Participants who received the third-party, verifiable information always received it aher the other infor· 
mation sources. 
party perspective on GM foods, we could 
determine the willingness to pay for individuals 
who received all perspectives on the GM food 
debate. 
Once we distributed the appropriate info-
packet to the participants in a given unit, we 
then conducted two auction rounds. The 
rounds were differentiated by the food label -
either the food had a standard food label or a 
label that indicated the status of genetic modi-
fication (e.g. see Fig. 4 .2).9 In one round 
(which could be Round 1 or 2 depending on 
the experimental unit), participants were bid-
ding on the three food products each with the 
standard food label. We made these labels as 
plain as possible to avoid any influence on the 
bids from the label design. In the other round, 
participants were bidding on the same three 
food products with either a GM label or a 
non-GM label. The GM and non-GM labels 
differed from the standard label only by the 
inclusion of one extra sentence. The GM label 
said This product is made using genetic modi-
fication (GM)', while the non-GM label said 
'This product is made without genetic modifi-
cation'. For each experimental unit, partici-
pants knew that only one round would be 
chosen as the binding round that determined 
auction winners. 
In Step 7, participants bid on three differ-
ent food products: a bottle of vegetable oil, a 
bag of tortilla chips and a bag of potatoes, 
either with the standard label or the label indi-
cating the product's GM status. Six groups bid 
on foods with plain labels and foods with 
labels saying 'made using genetic modification 
(GM)'. Four groups bid on foods with plain 
labels and foods with labels saying 'made 
without using genetic modification'. The par-
ticipants were instructed to examine the three 
products and then to write down their sealed 
bid for each of the three goods. Participants 
bid on each good separately. The monitor 
then collected the bids from the people and 
told them they were next going to look at 
another group of food items. Table 4.2 sum-
marizes the four treatments. 
Step 8 had participants examine the same 
three food products, each with a different label 
from Round l. lO Again the participants exam-
ined the products and bid on the three products 
separately. The bids were then collected from all 
of the individuals. In contrast to early experi-
mental auction work using repeated 
Vegetable Oil 
Net weight 32 oz. 
Vegetable 0 11 
Net weight 32 oz. 
This product is made without 
using genetic modification 
Vegetable 011 
Net weight 32 oz. 
This product is made using 
genetic modification (GM) 
Fig. 4.2. The three types of labels used for the 
vegetable oi l. 
9 Note that our labels are clearly displayed on the front of the package, where consumers would see them. 
See Noussair et al. (2002) for evidence of how consumers are not always likely to read food labels that 
are on the back of packages. 
10 We randomize the order the participants were presented the food products across groups. The null 
hypothesis that the round the consumer bid on foods led to the same bids cou ld not be rejected at a 5% 
level for any of the three goods under both a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Hence, the order in 
which consumers saw the items did not appear to matter. 
48 W.E. Huffman et al. 
Table 4.2. Information and labelling given to the four treatments. 
Treatment Labelling regime type 
---
1 Voluntary regime 
2 Voluntary regime 
3 Mandatory regime 
4 Mandatory regime 
trials, this auction used only two rounds to avoid 
any chance of affiliation of values and changes 
in willingness to pay due to the posted-market 
behaviour of other bidders (see List and 
Shogren, 1999; Knetsch et al., 2001). 
Step 9 selected the binding round, and the 
binding random nth-prices for the three 
goods. The winners were notified. In Step 10, 
each participant was asked to complete a 
brief post-auction questionnaire, and then the 
monitors dismissed the participants who did 
not win. The monitors and the winners then 
exchanged money for goods, and the auction 
winners were also dismissed. 
Data and Results 
The statistical analysis of our experimental 
data supports the hypothesis that consumers 
read similar signals in the two markets. The 
Number or trials 
Third party per treatment 
No 2 
Yes 2 
No 4 
Yes 2 
mean and median bids in the two markets 
are reported in Table 4.3. Eighty-six partici-
pants were in treatments that bid on the 
plain-labelled and GM-labelled food products 
(the mandatory GM-label market), and 56 
participants were in treatments that bid on 
the plain-labelled and non-GM-labelled food 
products (the voluntary GM-label market). 
For the participants who bid on the GM-
labelled and plain-labelled foods, consumers 
discounted the GM-labelled oil by an average 
of 11 cents, the GM-labelled tortilla chips by 
8 cents and the GM-labelled potatoes by 8 
cents. The participants who bid on the plain-
labelled food and the non-GM-labelled food 
discounted the plain-labelled oil by an aver-
age of 4 cents, the plain-labelled tortilla 
chips by 7 cents and the plain-labelled pota-
toes by 9 cents. 
Our main goal is to determine whether 
consumers can accurately decipher which 
Table 4.3. Mean bids: markets with mandatory and voluntary labels. 
n Mean bid so Median Minimum Maximum 
Mean bids for the mandatory GM-labelling market 
GM oil 86 0.63 0.65 0.50 0 2.75 
Oil 86 0.74 0.75 0.50 0 3.29 
GM tortilla chips 86 0.61 0.70 0.43 0 3.25 
Tortilla chips 86 0.69 0.72 0.50 0 2.89 
GM potatoes 86 0.59 0.54 0.50 0 2.00 
Potatoes 86 0.67 0.54 0.50 0 2.25 
Mean bids for the voluntary GM-labelling market 
Non-GM oil 56 0.80 0.80 0.50 0 4.75 
Oil 56 0.76 0.68 0.50 0 3.00 
Non-GM tortilla chips 56 0.75 0.81 0.50 0 4.00 
Tortilla chips 56 0.68 0.77 0.50 0 4.00 
Non-GM potatoes 56 0.84 0.75 0.75 0 4.00 
Potatoes 56 0.75 0.70 0.68 0 4.00 
food is GM irrespective of the labelling 
treatment. The size of the discount for the 
perceived GM food provides evidence 
about consumers' perception of the signals 
from the two labelling regimes. We tested 
null hypotheses that consumers did not dis-
count the perceived GM food in the two 
markets differently. Table 4.4 provides 
these results. The first column shows the 
difference in bids in the mandatory 
labelling trials; the second column shows 
the difference in bids in the voluntary 
labelling trials. The third column is the dif-
ference between these columns. The 
absolute difference is an average of 7 cents 
for vegetable oil, 1 cent for the tortilla 
chips and 1 cent for the potatoes. At the 
10% significance level, the tests show that 
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the difference in bids is zero for any of the 
three food products. l 1 Although none of 
the differences are statistically significant, 
at first glance it is curious that the mean 
discount under mandatory and voluntary 
labelling regimes is virtually identical for 
the tortilla chips and potatoes, yet it is con-
siderably larger for the vegetable oil. A 
possible explanation for the vegetable oil 
having an average of 7 cents difference is 
the fact that we used two different types of 
vegetable oil. l2 
Consumers discounted perceived GM 
food the same, irrespective of whether the 
market had mandatory or voluntary GM 
labelling. This result provides evidence 
that consumers receive the same signals 
under either regime. By not rejecting the 
thesis that consumers know GM from non-
GM food regardless of the labelling regimes, 
we have no evidence that the necessary 
condition of consumers reading signals dif-
ferently in a mandatory GM-labelling policy 
than in a voluntary GM-labelling policy is 
met. Without speculating beyond the reach 
of the laboratory, this finding supports those 
who believe the USA has been prudent in 
avoiding calls to initiate a mandatory GM-
labelling policy. 
Conclusion 
GM food labelling remains a controversial 
and an important issue in the USA. Some 
groups have called for mandatory labelling of 
GM foods, but others want to keep labelling 
voluntary. The benefit of mandatory labelling 
that is cited by its supporters is that it will 
help consumers to choose between GM and 
non-GM food products. We designed two 
experimental auction markets, one emulated 
a market that had a mandatory labelling pol-
Table 4.4. t-Test of null hypothesis that differences in bid differences are equal under two labelling regimes. 
Oil 
Tortilla chips 
Potatoes 
Difference in bids for 
GM and plain labelled -
mandatory regime 
(n= 86) 
0.11 
0.08 
0.09 
Difference in bids for 
the plain-labelled 
and non-GM-
voluntary regime 
(n = 56) Difference 
0.04 
0.07 
0.08 
0.07 
0.01 
0.01 
t-Test statistic 
0.90 
0.03 
0.20 
1 Regression models were also fitting to test whether demographic characteristics made a difference on the 
discount for the perceived GM food. No demographic characteristic affected significantly the discount 
for the perceived GM food. Also, one could not reject the null hypothesis that third-party information 
did not affect the difference in the discount for the perceived GM food. 
12 We also ran Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to see if one could reject that consumers had different behaviour 
for the different label types. The results for the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are similar to those of the t-test 
results, showing that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that consumers perceive the signals from the 
two labelling policies the same. 
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icy in place, the o ther emulated a market 
that had a voluntary labelling policy in 
place. We found no evidence that con-
sumers could more easily distinguish which 
product was GM or non-GM in the manda-
tory labelling market. This provides evidence 
that the voluntary labelling policy in the 
USA is the best policy. 
One further avenue for research would be 
to examine the international dimension to 
GM food labels, say in Europe or Australia. 
For example, do consumers in those coun-
tries read the same signals of genetic modifi-
cation in voluntary labelling markets as in 
mandatory labelling markets? If people can 
read the signals for which food is GM accu-
rately in either mandatory or voluntary GM-
labelling regimes, this calls into question the 
relevance and usefulness of the mandatory 
labelling policies throughout the world . 
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